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Abstract
This paper argues for a new interpretation of the notion of “unity” in Wang Yang-
ming’s famous doctrine of the “unity of knowledge and action” (zhi xing he yi知行
合一). I distinguish two parts of Wang’s doctrine: one concerning training (gong fu
工夫), and one concerning the “original natural condition” of knowledge and action
(ben ti本體). I focus on the latter aspect of the doctrine, and argue that Wang holds,
roughly, that a person exhibits knowledge in its original natural condition if and
only if they exhibit action in its original natural condition. Moreover, I argue that
Wang denies that knowledge in its original natural condition is identical to action
in its original natural condition.
Keywords: unity of knowledge and action, Wang Yangming, moral psychology
1 Introduction
The great Ming dynasty (明 1368-1644) philosopher Wang Shouren (王守仁, Yangming
陽明, 1472-1529) saw his philosophical work in part as medicine for the moral maladies
of his time. Wang claimed that the orthodoxy of that time – most associated with the
Song dynasty (宋 960-1279) philosopher Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130-1200) – recommended that
students intent on becoming virtuous separate their study into two phases: a first fo-
cused on acquiring and perfecting knowledge; and a second focused on applying this
perfected knowledge in action. Wang argued that this division of learning into stages
had led his contemporaries to become ineffectual. Since they thought they had to wait
*Thanks to Suhyun Ahn, PJ Ivanhoe, Justin Tiwald, Hwa Yeong Wang for detailed comments. Thanks
also to two referees and especiallyHuangYong as editor of this journal formany suggestions and criticisms.
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until they had perfected their knowledge before taking any action “straight to the end
of their lives they do not act” (遂終身不行). As a “medicine to treat this disease” (對病
的藥), he proposed his famous doctrine of “the unity of knowledge and action” (知行合
一).1
Wang’s diagnosis of his contemporaries’ disease, and his strategy for treating that
disease, are both tolerably clear. But Wang did not only describe the doctrine of the
unity of knowledge and action as a form of medicine. He claimed also that “the original
natural condition of knowledge and action are fundamentally like this [i.e. unified]”
(知行本體原是如此). And here it is harder to make out his guiding idea. In describing
the “natural condition” of knowledge and action, was he simply adding emphasis to
his prescription for his contemporaries’ malady? Or was he making a new, different
claim about the nature of knowledge and action – about how they in some sense really
are? And if he did intend a new claim of this kind, did he endorse the radical idea
that knowledge and action are identical, that they are, somehow, one and the very same
thing?
These questions are intimately related to broader ones about the overall aims of
Wang’s thought. Many philosophers would happily say that the questions they aim
to answer, and the answers they give to these questions, have at most an obscure rela-
tionship to practical questions about how tomake oneself a better citizen, friend, parent,
or child. Wang, by contrast, held that one should only consider questions and theories
which have some promise to help people with practical matters like these. This strong
emphasis on ethical practice has led some to wonder whether Wang ever engaged in
anything we might call “theoretical philosophy” at all. Did he intend to make claims
that accurately describe the way things are, and which he hoped his hearers would be-
lieved (or reject) on the basis of evidence? Or did he instead offer something more like
pills than propositions, ideas which might alter a person’s habits of mind through a
pathway other than belief, and which should be assessed for their potency, not their
truth?
In this paper, I propose and argue for an interpretation of the term “unity” in “the
unity of knowledge and action”, with an eye to how this interpretation bears on broader
1Throughout the paper, I cite passages from the Instructions for Practical Living (Chuanxi Lu 傳習錄,
hereafter IPL) by the section number of Chan’s editions (Chan (1963), Chan (1983)), followed by a page
number in Wu et al. (2011) (indicated by “QJ”). Passages in Wang’s works outside the IPL are cited by the
juan number, a period, and then the page number (e.g. “QJ 6.242”). Where available, I also cite pages in
the translations of Ching (1972). This passage is taken from IPL 5, QJ 5; see below, [T2]. All translations
in the paper are mine, although I have always consulted the translations in Chan (1963) and Ching (1972),
as well as the translations in Ivanhoe (2009), and the revised versions of them, in Tiwald & Van Norden
(2014), where relevant.
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questions about Wang’s aims.2 I argue that Wang held, roughly, that a person exhibits
the “original natural condition” of knowledge if and only if they exhibit the “original
natural condition” of action, and that Wang did not hold that the original natural con-
ditions of knowledge and action are identical. I show how some of Wang’s apparently
radicalmethodological remarks about the therapeutic purpose of his doctrine on inspec-
tion support the view that he understood this claim about the original natural condition
of knowledge and action to accurately describe knowledge and action. My investiga-
tion thus supports a conservative position about Wang’s aims, suggesting that Wang
was indeed engaged in something naturally understood as “theoretical philosophy”, at
least some of the time.3
Section 2 lays out evidence that Wang’s doctrine falls into two parts, one about eth-
ical training (gong fu工夫) and one about the “original natural condition” (ben ti本體)
of knowledge and action. Section 3, the core of the paper, focuses on the original nat-
ural condition of knowledge and action, and argues that Wang endorses a principle I
call “Unity”. Section 4 presents a principle I call “Identity”, considers the merits of an
interpretation which attributes it to Wang, and argues that Wang does not endorse it.
Section 5 concludes, returning to broader issues about Wang’s aims.
2 Training and the original natural condition
Wang’s striking slogan “the unity of knowledge and action” inspired his contempo-
raries to wonder whether he really meant what he seemed to say. In an important letter
to Gu Lin (顧璘, Dongqiao東橋, 1476-1545), Wang quotes Gu as follows:4
2The paper does not aim to offer a comprehensive interpretation of the unity of knowledge and action
as a whole, but only of how we should understand the notion of “unity” in this doctrine. In developing
my interpretation of this notion, I will to a great extent treat “knowledge” and “action” as placeholders,
abstracting from substantive issues about howWang understood these terms. I provide more substantive
interpretations of the kind of knowledge operative in the doctrine in Lederman (2020b,a).
3A word about how I will handle the secondary literature in this paper: many scholarly discussions
of the unity of knowledge and action (Ching (1976, p. 66-68), Cua (1982),Ivanhoe (2002, e.g. p. 78-80,
p. 99-100), Shun (2011, §II), Wu (2011, Ch. 5), Yu (2014), Angle & Tiwald (2017, p. 127-131), Shi (2017),
Zheng (2018), Van Norden (2019), Zheng (2019)) include claims (and some arguments for those claims)
which clearly bear on the question of the sense in which knowledge and action are unified, but they do not
consider this question directly in its own right. Since it would require a great amount of space to settle
what these authors’ views on my central question are, for the sake of space and tractability, I have largely
(though not exclusively) focused on engaging in detail with authors who do discuss the question more
thematically, e.g. Lao (2019 (1984-6)), Frisina (1989), Chen (1991), Lee (1994), Chen (2015), Huang (2017).
4Throughout this paper I will assume without argument that Wang’s views on the unity of knowledge
and action remained consistent from 1509, when he first proposed the unity of knowledge and action, until
his death in 1529. I will thus freely draw onworks like this letter, whichwaswritten considerably later than
1509 (at least after 1524). Those skeptical of this assumption can see the paper as arguing for conditional





Your letter says: “ ‘Genuine knowledge is just what is employed in perform-
ing an action. Without action, it is not sufficient to be called “knowledge”.’
If you set forth this teaching as an urgent measure (喫緊立教) for those who
are learning, to help them in their personal conduct, that is acceptable. But
if you genuinely mean that acting just is knowing, I’m afraid that [students]
will exclusively focus on seeking their original mind and leave behind the
li of things, so that there must be some places where they will be stuck and
can’t get through. How then could this be the sages’ established method of
the joint advancement of knowledge and action?” (IPL 133, QJ 47)
Here Gu presents a sharp distinction between “an urgent measure for those who are
learning”, and “genuinely” asserting a doctrine. Gu’s description of an “urgent mea-
sure” calls to mind the Buddhist notion of an “expedient means” (Ch. fangbian 方便,
Sk. upaya), broadly the idea that a teacher may sometimes assert falsehoods in order
to help their students make progress (see, e.g., Watson (1993, p. 56-60)). Gu expresses
the concern that, if Wang’s doctrine is not to be understood merely as a false but pos-
sibly useful urgent measure, it will lead to a one-sided focus on inner development, to
the exclusion of important external matters, indicated here by the expression “the li of
things” (wu li物理).5
In his reply, Wang accepts something like Gu’s distinction between modes of teach-
ing (urgent vs. genuine), but rejects Gu’s implicit assumption that the two options ex-
clude each other:




[a1] The genuine, practical, earnest and effective aspects of knowledge are
[a matter of] action. The lucid, perceptive, focused, discriminating aspects of
action are [a matter of] knowledge.6 [a2] The training (gong fu工夫) of knowl-
edge and action at root cannot be separated. [a3] It is only because later gen-
erations have divided them, making them two stages of applying one’s effort
(yong gong用功), and losing the original natural condition of knowledge and
action (zhi xing ben ti知行本體), that I have proposed the theory of their unity
5I won’t discuss in this paper the fraught question of how exactly we should understand li (理); the
reader can treat the notion as a black box.
6My translation of ji即here as “is amatter of” is controversial; I come back to how it should be translated
in detail in section 4.
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and joint advancement. [a4] “Genuine knowledge is what is employed in
performing an action. Without action, it is not sufficient to be called ‘knowl-
edge’.” …[a5] Although this is something I put forward as an urgent mea-
sure, to rescue people from a fault, knowledge and action are originally (ben
lai本來) like this in their natural condition (zhi xing zhi ti知行之體). I did not
follow my own inclinations to promote or demote one of them, temporarily
endorsing this theory for its efficacy at this one time. (IPL 133, QJ 47-8)
In [a2] Wang says that the training (gong fu 工夫) for knowledge and action are in-
separable. In [a3] and [a5] he says that in their “original natural condition” (ben ti 本
體) or just plain “natural condition” (ti 體) knowledge and action are unified. These
remarks suggest that Wang sees his doctrine as consisting of two parts, one which de-
scribes the training of knowledge and action, and one which describes their original
natural condition. And crucially, in response to Gu, he says that his doctrine is both an
urgent measure, and an accurate description of knowledge and action in their original
natural condition ([a5]).
The terms which I have translated as “training” (gong fu工夫) and “original natural
condition” (ben ti本體) are semi-technical terms for those working in Wang’s tradition,
which are not readily interpretable on their own, so I will pause for a moment to dis-
cuss them. Throughout, I will translate gong fu as “training” for the sake of uniformity,
although in some cases it might be better rendered as “practice” or even as “effort” or
“skill”.7 In English some forms of “training” have a built-in endpoint: a trainee doctor,
for example, might engage in training that would be inappropriate for a doctor at a later
stage of their career. Gong fu should not be understood as training of this kind. Instead,
like “physical training” which is still required for athletes at the top of their game, gong
fumay be required even for those who are already excellent in a given domain to main-
tain their level of excellence. The most common uses of gong fu that we will encounter
are in the phrases the “training of knowledge” (知之工夫) or “the training of action”
(行之工夫). By these expressions, Wang means a regime dedicated to improving or
maintaining the level of one’s knowledge or action; the expressions might be more col-
loquially rendered as “knowledge training” or “action training” on themodel of “speed
training” or “strength training”.
Our second phrase, “original natural condition” ben ti 本體, which is often trans-
lated as “original substance”, is in some ways more complex. It is composed of two
7Myworking hypothesis is that in the passages we will consider the homophonic expression功夫 (note
the variant first character) is an orthographic variant of the same word. So I will translate 功夫 also as
“training”, though I always print the Chinese as well for those whowish to track the distinction. I translate
the word功, written with the first character of功夫 (the variant), as “effort” throughout, though it too has
a broader semantic range, and can mean “effects” or “results” as well.
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characters, one that I translate “original” (ben本) and one that I translate “natural con-
dition” (ti 體).8 Wang can use ben ti in two related but slightly different ways: he can
speak of it as something which can be lost and must be restored, or he can speak of it
as something which can never be lost.9 In my view, in the former cases, ben ti means
roughly “the state something would be in if nothing was added to it and nothing inter-
fered with it” (hence “original natural condition”), while in the latter it refers to (again,
roughly) an internal feature of the thing which is responsible for the fact that it would
be in the relevant state, if nothing was added to it or interfered with it (corresponding
to one colloquial use of “nature” or “essence”).10 Below, it will be important to me that
there is a use of ben ti on which it picks out a condition that can be lost. But otherwise,
most of what I will say about the notion should be fairly uncontroversial. In particular,
I will not be relying heavily on the glosses I just gave; those who already have views
about how to understand the notion should be able to import them here.
As we will see, Wang uses these two terms – “training” and “original natural condi-
tion” – comparatively frequently to distinguish between two parts of his doctrine. But
Wang also has a second way of marking what seems to be the same distinction. In [a2]
above, Wang articulates two problems with his contemporaries: first, a fault connected
to effort (gong功) (which is etymologically and conceptually related to training (gongfu
工夫/功夫)); second, one associated with “original natural condition” (benti本體). He
then sums up his own positive doctrine – the antidote to these problems – with the for-
mula “unity and joint advancement” (合一並進). The parallelism between the foregoing
description and this two-part formula, together with the fact that the meaning of “joint
advancement” ties it closely to “training”, makes it natural to see the formula as de-
8“Natural condition” is my gloss on a single word; there is no distinct lexical or semantic item in the
expression (ti體) which corresponds to my “natural”. In particular, there is no use of any cognate for the
word commonly (and reasonably) translated as “nature” (xing 性); the concept of xing and that of ben ti
have a conceptual relationship, but not an etymological one. When it does not occur in the phrase ben ti (本
體) the character ti (體) has a considerably broader semantic range than “natural condition”. Fortunately
every use of ti體 we will encounter this paper – like the one in [a5] above – is most naturally understood
as an abbreviation for ben ti本體, so we do not need to engage with this broader use in detail.
9For instance, just considering Wang’s uses of the expression “the original natural condition of the
mind” (心之本體), we find Wang saying that it can be “lost” (失) in: IPL 34 QJ 17, IPL 222 QJ 108-9 cf. IPL
204QJ 104. He says that it must be “restored” (復) in: e.g. IPL 121QJ 40, IPL 127QJ 43 (性之本體); IPL 145,
QJ 66 (repeated in IPL 169, QJ 81); IPL 237 QJ 112-113; QJ 5.216, cf. Ching (1972, p. 87) cf. IPL 101 QJ 34.
But in other passages he describes it as something which everyone has, and can only be obstructed, not
lost: IPL 48, QJ 20, IPL 152 QJ 69, IPL 155 QJ 70-71, IPL 221 QJ 108, cf. QJ 7.271 (本體之知).
10Mou Zongsan (1972) proposes that the expression be translated “in-itself”, so that the present phrase
would be “knowledge and action in themselves” (see also the English translation of part of the article as
Mou (1973)); Angle and Tiwald propose “inherent reality” (Angle & Tiwald (2017)). Both of these transla-
tions (reasonably) emphasize the second use of ben it, while mine emphasizes the first (since that use will
be more relevant to us here). But what I say above is meant to be compatible with Mou’s and Angle and
Tiwald’s understanding of the term.
6
scribing the same two aspects of Wang’s doctrine, with “joint advancement” describing
the “training” for knowledge and action, and “unity” describing their “original natural
condition”. (The shorter formula, “unity of knowledge and action”, presumably uses
“unity” to cover both aspects.) In other passages, too, Wang connects the expanded
slogan to the two parts of his doctrine: when they occur together, “unity” is associated
with original natural condition, and “joint advancement” with training.11
The idea thatWang drew something like this distinction, and even that it was central
to his understanding of the doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action, is not new
to this paper.12 I have spent some time rehearsing evidence that he did draw it, for two
main reasons. First, not everyone agrees about which terms of Wang’s are associated
with which aspects of the doctrine. At several points below, I will defend my interpre-
tation of Wang’s views about the unity of the original natural condition of knowledge
and action by dismissing certain passages on the grounds that they do not describe
the original natural condition of knowledge and action, but instead describe training.
In making these arguments, I will rely on claims I have argued for here, about which
terms are associated with which parts of his doctrine.
Second, the distinction between training and original natural condition provides us
with a way into our broader question about Wang’s philosophical aims. In [T1], Wang
says that he sees his doctrine both as an “urgent method” and as offering a description
of the “original natural condition” of knowledge and action. The passage reveals not
only that he does recognize a possible distinction between these two projects, but also
that he understands the distinction between these two modes of teaching in part as a
distinction between teaching aimed at practical applications and teaching aimed at de-
11IPL 132QJ 46 ties “joint advancement” to training (工夫). In IPL 136QJ 52, Wang contrasts “the natural
condition of the unity of mind and li with the effort of the joint advancement of knowledge and action”
(心理合一之體，知行並進之功). In one passage, Wang even describes “joint advancement” as leading to
unity: “This is what the ancients’ learning took to be the effort of jointly advancing knowledge and action,
so that they are unified” (此古人之學所以知行並進而收合一之功 QJ 8.308)
12Something like it is recognized by, e.g., Tu (1976, p. 150-153), Lao (2019 (1984-6), 3.422-23), Chen (1991,
p. 93-108), Shun (2011, p. 98-9), Wu (2011, p. 91-7), Chen (2015, p. 7-8).
In support of the claim that the distinction was central to Wang’s view of the doctrine, note that Wang
explicitly describes this contrast or implicitly relies upon it in a wide range of further passages in the
corpus, which cover a period of many years. In IPL 136 (QJ 52), Wang discusses a contrast between a unity
doctrine related to the “natural condition” (ti 體) of mind and li, with a “joint advancement” doctrine
associated with effort (gong 功). IPL 165 QJ 78 contrasts understanding of “knowledge and action” in
regard to “applying effort” (yong gong用功) with understanding them in regard to their “original natural
condition”, cautioning his correspondent to “examine the two characters closely” (二字更宜警精察). QJ
6.232 contrasts theway the ancients spoke of training (工夫) with theway knowledge and action are unified
in their “natural condition and structure” (知行體段本來) (Ching (1972, p. 107)). In other passages Wang
highlights just “training” in connection to knowledge and action (IPL 26, QJ 15 (gong fu功夫); IPL 132, QJ
46 (gong fu工夫)) or just “natural condition” ([T4]. He also draws the full contrast in connection to “inner
and outer” (an issue related for him to the unity of knowledge and action) in IPL 204, QJ 104.
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scribing knowledge and action. In [a5], in particular, when Wang says that his doctrine
is not only an urgent measure, and also not only something he merely endorsed for its
efficacy at one time, it is hard to resist a reading where he means to say that, in addition
to having these practical aims, his doctrine also accurately describes knowledge and
action.
In the rest of this section, I will support my claim that Wang’s views about the orig-
inal natural condition of knowledge and action are intended to accurately describe the
way things are. This discussion is important to my overall project in the paper. But it
will be something of a digression from the main line of argument, which is more nar-
rowly focused on the notion of unity. So those who are eager to get to the discussion of
unity may wish to skip to the next section at this point.
I will support my claim that Wang means his doctrine to accurately describe knowl-
edge and action by responding to an important objection to it. The objection is based on
the following passage, a record of a conversation between Wang and his favorite stu-
dent Xu Ai (徐愛 1487-1517). I will quote the passage at some length, because it gives
us further evidence about how Wang uses the distinction between training and origi-
nal natural condition, and also because it will be important not only here, but in later














[b] [b1] This then is the original natural condition of knowledge and of action,
which have not been divided by selfish inclinations. The sage taught people
that only a person in this state can be said to know. If they are not in this
state, then they do not yet know. [b2] But (que卻) how urgent, practical and
effective this training [gongfu 工夫] is! [b3] What is the goal [yi 意] of those
today who strenuously and persistently say that knowledge and action are
two things? What is the goal [yi意] of my saying that they are one thing? [b4]
If you do not know [zhi知] my purpose [zong zhi宗旨] in setting forth these
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words, and only care about saying that they are one or that they are two, what
use would it have?
[c] Xu Ai said: “In saying that knowledge and action are two things, the an-
cients also wanted people to see distinctly that one thing (yi xing一行) is the
training (gongfu功夫) of knowledge, and that another thing (一行) is the train-
ing of action, since only in this way will one’s training have direction.”
[d] The Master said: “ But this is to lose [sight of] the purpose [zong zhi宗旨]
of the ancients....
[e1] “People now rely on the claim that knowledge and action are distin-
guished into two things when they act. [e2] They think that one must first
know and only then is one able to act, [saying] [e3] ‘For the time being I will
discuss and debate, engaging in the training (gong fu 工夫) of knowledge.
Only after my knowledge has become genuine, will I engage in the training
of action’. For this reason, straight to the end of their lives they do not act,
and straight to the end of their lives they do not know. This is not a minor
disease, and it has not come about in a single day. [e4] My doctrine of the
unity of knowledge and action is medicine to treat this disease. But it is also
not a baseless fabrication: the natural condition of knowledge and action are
fundamentally like this. [e5] If now you know my purpose, then even if you
say that they are two it does not matter, since they are just one thing. If you do
not understand my purpose, then if you say they are one, what affair could it
help with? You will just be talking idly.” (IPL 5, QJ 4-5)
The objection I will consider starts fromWang’s remarks in [b3-4] and in [e5]. There,
Wang says that he does not care especially whether a person believes the truth about
knowledge and action; all that matters to him is whether they understand the aim of
his doctrine. The objector claims that these remarks show that Wang either does not
accept the idea that there are facts about knowledge and action, or at least does not care
to articulate them. As a result, Wang’s claims about the original natural condition of
knowledge and action should not be understood as describing the way that knowledge
and action are.
In response, I agree with the objector that Wang strongly prioritizes practice over
theory, and that the goal of this passage is to emphasize the priority of practice. But I
disagree that Wang denies that a part of his doctrine can be understood to accurately
describe the way things are. In fact, I believe that in this passage Wang shows quite
clearly that he understands his doctrine about the original natural condition to accu-
rately describe an aspect of knowledge and action.
Before I argue for this claim, I want to establish a few facts about how Wang de-
ploys the distinction between training and original natural condition in our passage.
The passage is the final section of a longer discussion of the original natural condition
9
of knowledge and action (see below [T3]). The text in [b1] marks the formal conclusion
of Wang’s comments on that topic. In [b2] Wang transitions to a discussion of training,
indicating the shift in topic with a contrastive particle (que卻). In [c], Xu Ai picks up the
distinction Wang has just drawn, saying that in distinguishing knowledge and action,
the ancients “also” (yi 亦) wanted to propose a doctrine about training. In the sequel,
Wang responds to Xu by focusing his own comments on training both explicitly in text
from [d] elided above, and also in [e2] and [e3]. In [e4], he sums up the discussion by re-
iterating that his doctrine is both promulgated as a medicine to treat a disease, and also
intended to describe the original natural condition of knowledge and action. The pas-
sage is thus a beautiful example of how Wang and his interlocutors rely on and utilize
the distinction between training and original natural condition quite systematically.
Wit this paragraphing before us, we can confront the objection head on. Wang says
in [e4], that his doctrine is not only therapeutic, but also that the original natural condi-
tion of knowledge and action are like this; he clearly holds that his doctrine accurately
describes how they would be in this state. Pace our objector, Wang does not deny the
distinction between correct description and practical application; on the contrary, he
explicitly draws that distinction. Moreover, [e5] provides a further striking piece of ev-
idence for my interpretation and against the objector. There, Wang says – as he had in
said also in [b4] – that understanding the purpose of his doctrine is key to using it for
practical purposes. In fact, he says, understanding this purpose is so important, that
even someone who denies the letter of the doctrine can still achieve a virtuous state
where their knowledge and action would be unified, provided they understand its pur-
pose. In this comment, even as Wang emphasizes the importance of practical conse-
quences over theoretical correctness, he still recognizes that when this person says that
knowledge and action are two will be speaking incorrectly because their knowledge and
action will in fact be one. Far from obliterating the distinction between practical mis-
takes and mistakes in one’s beliefs (or speech), Wang carefully toes his way around this
distinction in the way he describes the special case of someone who understands the
purpose of his doctrine, but rejects the letter of it.
Everyone should agree that Wang strongly emphasizes practice over theory. But he
does also recognize a distinction between assessing claims for usefulness and assess-
ing them as correct descriptions of the way things are. Moreover, the texts we have
examined strongly suggest that he intends at least his claims about the original natural
condition of knowledge and action to fall in the latter category. These points will be im-
portant later on, when I defend my interpretation of Wang’s understanding of “unity”
against various objections. But they are also of interest in their own right, as evidence
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for a conservative understanding of Wang’s philosophical aims.
3 Unity
In the previous section, we saw that the doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action
has two parts: one about the training for knowledge and action, and one about their
original natural condition. The main goal of the remainder of the paper will be to argue
for an analysis of howWang understands the notion of “unity” as applied to the original
natural condition of knowledge and action.
Before we turn to that topic, however, it is worth saying something about howWang
understands the notion of “unity” on the training side of his doctrine. In this connection,
Wang writes: “Knowledge and action are originally (原) two words which describe one
training (工夫). This one training must be described by these two words. Only then
will you have described it completely without defects (知行原是兩箇字説一箇工夫，
這一箇工夫須著此兩箇字，方説得完全無弊病, QJ 6.233 Ching (1972, p. 107-8)). In
this passage, it is fairly clear that Wang understands identity as at least one operative
notion of “unity” for the training aspect of his doctrine; he holds that the training for
knowledge and the training for action are one and the same.13
13In some other passages Wang frames the “unity” of knowledge and action in training (工夫) slightly
differently. There, he seems to understand the “unity” on the training side as the idea that phases of “know-
ing” and phases of “acting” alternate in such a way that it is impossible to distinguish a first “knowing”
phase of training from a second “acting” phase. In famous examples from the letter to Gu Dongqiao ( IPL
132QJ 46-7 and IPL 136QJ 51-2), where Wang is more or less explicit that he is discussing training and not
the original natural condition of knowledge and action, Wang has this second point most firmly in view.
In the first of these passages, Gu claims that one knows food and soup before eating them, knows clothes
before wearing them, and knows a road one travels on before traveling it. Wang responds that in each
case a desire, i.e. an inclination, which is a part of action, precedes some relevant knowledge – presumably
knowing the food, soup, clothes and road by sight – so this knowledge does not entirely precede action.
Wang also argues that an important form of knowledge – bodily experience of the taste of the food and
soup, and of the feel of the clothes and road – comes after the physical action, so one only gains complete
knowledge after some action. The same idea about the alternation or interpenetration of stages of knowing
and acting is in the background in IPL 136 (QJ 51), where Wang discusses how one must engage in actions
to learn how to shoot a bow or how to write. His point is not that the nature of the relevant knowledge is
such as to require antecedent action, but rather that some action is involved in typical examples of acquir-
ing the relevant form of knowledge. This latter idea illustrates his main thought, which is that phases of
action and phases of knowing must both occur on the path to the ideal state of virtue.
There are a number of ways of understanding this claim about alternation, so that it is compatible with
my claim in the main text that the training of knowledge and action are identical. Perhaps Wang uses the
terms “knowledge” and “action” somewhat differently here: he is not describing the training in terms of
the ideal state of knowledge or action at which it aims – neither form of knowledge or action is knowledge
or action in their original natural condition – but rather in terms of how the activities involved in the
training might be conventionally described. Alternatively, he may use the word “training” differently in
the two sets of passage. A third idea (compatible with the first two, but independent of them) is that he
means to use these examples to motivate his main idea (that the training for knowledge and action are
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Unfortunately, however, there is no similarly crisp statement in the surviving texts
of Wang’s views about the notion of unity operative for the original natural condition
of knowledge and action. The rest of this section will be devoted to teasing his views
on this topic out of the texts. I will first argue that Wang can describe knowledge in
its original natural condition as “genuine knowledge” and that he thinks of action in
its original natural condition as action exhibiting some virtue, for instance filial piety
(xiao孝, hereafter “filiality”) or fraternal respect (ti悌, hereafter “respect”) (section 3.1).
I will then argue that for a range of traditional virtues like filiality and respect, Wang
endorses claims of the form:
Unity A person genuinely knows filiality if and only if they are acting filially.
I will argue for attributing this principle (and related ones for other virtues) to Wang in
two steps.14 First, I will argue that Wang endorses the right-to-left direction of Unity,
that is, (AK) if a person is acting filially, they genuinely know filiality (section 3.2). And
second, I will argue that Wang endorses the left-to-right direction of Unity, that is, (KA)
if a person genuinely knowsfiliality, they are acting filially (section 3.3). The conjunction
of AK and KA is equivalent to Unity; so, if Wang endorses both of them, he endorses
Unity.
My discussion throughout the section will be centered on one key passage. Since
the details of this passage will be important throughout, I will quote it in full here at
the start. Prior to the passage, Xu Ai asks Wang about an apparent difficulty with the
doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action, and Wang asks him to give an example
illustrating his point. Xu replies:
如今人儘有知得父當孝、兄當弟者，却不能孝、不能弟，便是知與行分明是
兩件。
For instance, today everyone knows that they should be filial to their par-
ents, and that they should be respectful to their older brothers, but they are
unable to be filial, and unable to be respectful. So in this case, knowledge
and action are separated, and are clearly two things. (IPL 5, QJ 4)
identical), by illustrating that they do not occur in phases which can be neatly separated. In either case, it
seems to me, this different way of describing training can be seen as complementary to, and not in tension
with, the central claim that the training of knowledge and action is identical.
14I believe Wang also endorses variants of this principle for other virtues: for conscientiousness (zhong
忠), humaneness (ren仁), and compassion (ce yin)惻隱). When I use the name “Unity” (and also the names
of similar principles, which will only be stated explicitly for filiality) I will sometimes mean not just the
claim displayed above in particular, but the whole family of principles. For respect, see IPL 5, QJ 4. For
conscientiousness and humaneness, see IPL 139, QJ 56. For compassion, see IPL 8, QJ 7; IPL 135, QJ 50-1.
I follow tradition in translating 惻隱 as “compassion” but the term might be better rendered as “being
pained by” or “unable to bear”; see e.g. Shun (2018, p. 90) for discussion.
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Xu’s example is related to examples of akrasia; the people he describes know that
they ought to perform an action, but they voluntarily fail to do it nevertheless. Xu takes
this kind of case to threaten the unity of knowledge and action, presumably because
these people’s actions are not responsive to what they know about what they should
do. In his reply, Wang defends the doctrine by introducing a distinction between the
knowledge and action of the people Xu describes, and knowledge and action in their
original natural condition. Wang’s reply occupies the text immediately preceding [T2];
the last sentences of this excerpt ([h5]) are the first sentences of that one ([b1]):









自痛了方知痛，[h3] 知寒，必已自寒了︔[h4] 知饑，必已自饑了︔[h5] 知行
如何分得開︖此便是知行的本體，不曾有私意隔斷的。聖人教人，必要是如
此，方可謂之知。不然，只是不曾知。
[f] [f1] In this case, knowledge and action have already been divided by selfish
desires; they are no longer in the original natural condition (ben ti) of knowl-
edge and action. [f2] No one has ever known but failed to act. If one knows
but does not act, one simply does not yet know. [f3] In regard to knowledge
and action, the sages and worthies taught people to stabilize and restore that
original natural condition; they did not order people to do any old thing and
then just stop.
[g] [g1] For this reason, the Great Learning points to genuine knowledge and
action for people to see. [g2] It says they are “like loving lovely sights and hat-
ing hateful odors.”15 [g3] Seeing a lovely sight belongs to knowledge, while
loving a lovely sight belongs to action. But when someone sees a lovely sight,
he already at that time automatically loves it. It is not that after seeing it he ad-
ditionally makes up his mind to love it. [g4] Smelling a hateful odor belongs
to knowledge, while hating a hateful odor belongs to action. When someone
smells a hateful odor, he already at that time automatically hates it. It is not
that after smelling it he separately makes up his mind to hate it. [g5] It’s like a
15Amore literal translation might be “like loving a beautiful sight, and hating a bad odor”. I have opted
for the translation in the main text in an attempt to imitate the fact that “love” is written with the same
character (好) as the adjective I have translated “lovely” (although they are pronounced differently) and
the verb “hate” is written with the same character (惡) as the adjective I have translated “hateful”(although
they too are pronounced differently).
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person with his nose blocked: even if he sees something with a hateful smell
in front of him, in his nose, he has not smelt it. So while he doesn’t really hate
it, this is only because he does not yet know the odor.
[h] [h1] The same goes for saying that someone knowsfilial piety or that some-
one knows fraternal respect. They must have at some point acted filially or
acted respectfully, before they can be said to know filial piety or fraternal re-
spect.16 [h2] If a person merely knows how to say some filial or respectful
words, that’s not enough for it to be acceptable to say that they know filial
piety or fraternal respect. [h2] Knowledge of pain is also like this. [h3] One
must have been in pain oneself to know pain. [h4] One must have been cold
oneself to know cold. One must have been hungry oneself to know hunger.
How then can knowledge and action be separated? [h5] This then is the orig-
inal natural condition of knowledge and action, which have not been divided
by selfish inclinations. The sage taught people that only a person in this state
can be said to know. If they are not in this state, then they do not yet know.
(IPL, 5, QJ, 4)
3.1 Genuine knowledge and virtuous action
My first task is to make a little progress on what Wang takes the original natural condi-
tion of knowledge and action to be.
Wang says (in [f]) that the knowledge and action in Xu’s example are no longer
knowledge and action in their original natural condition. He goes on (in [g1]) to describe
this form of knowledge and action as “genuine knowledge and action”. In [f2] Wang
uses “know” and “act” without any qualification, but in both [f1] and [f3] he is explicit
that he is considering the original natural condition of knowledge and action, so it is
clear that in [f2] and in the passage as a whole he has this “genuine knowledge and
action” (and not just plain knowledge and action) in mind. He does not intend to claim
that the people in Xu’s example have no knowledge at all, anymore than he means to
claim that they fail to act at all. Instead, he seems to accept that they have some form
of knowledge and action, and to deny only that they exhibit knowledge and action in
their original natural condition.
In [g1]Wang describes both knowledge and action as genuine, but it is clear in other
passages that Wang takes “genuineness” to be most importantly an attribute of an ideal
form of knowledge, and not of an ideal form of action. Later in this same passage, Wang
uses “genuine” in application to knowledge alone (this was quoted above in [T2],知得
真 [e3]). In [T1] [a], in a set phrase which Wang repeats several other times (see below
16I defend the “objectual” reading of these examples in detail in Lederman (2020b, §2), cf. Lederman
(2020a, §3).
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?? for citations), “genuine” is on the list of attributes of “knowledge”, not of action. In
[T1] ([d]) Wang describes “genuine knowledge” (真知) specifically as “what is used in
performing an action” (以為行). And finally, in a striking passage where Wang says
that it is as hard to convey what it is like to be in an ideal state of virtue as it is for a
mute person to describe the taste of bitter melon, Xu Ai – who happens to be standing
by – says that “it is only in this way that it is genuine knowledge, which is [a matter
of] acting” (如此才是真知，即是行矣 IPL 125, QJ 42). Together these passages provide
strong support for the claim that Wang could use “genuine knowledge” as a technical
term to describe the form of knowledge relevant to the unity of knowledge and action.
By contrast, there are no passages at all in which Wang speaks of “genuine action” on
its own. So, while Wang does use “genuine” here to describe knowledge and action
together, it seems clear that he typically associates genuineness with the elevated form
of knowledge relevant to the unity of knowledge and action, not with an elevated form
of action.
The idea that Wang emphasizes “genuine knowledge” (and not “genuine action”)
is further supported by the fact that this expression had a venerable history predating
Wang, some of which would have been well known to him. The expression is used as
early as theZhuangzi (3rd c. BCE) (The Great andMost HonoredMaster, 1), butmuchmore
importantly for Wang, Song (宋 960-1279) authors used the term fairly extensively. In
a pair of famous passages, Cheng Yi (程頤 1033-1107), for example, says that someone
who has previously been mauled by a tiger will change his countenance at the news
that a tiger is roaming the countryside, whereas people who have never encountered a
tiger may know that tigers are to be feared, but they will not change their appearance.
In the first of these passages, Cheng describes this difference in people’s response as
illustrative of the difference between genuine knowledge (真知) and ordinary knowl-
edge (常知), stating that it is the former which is key to virtuous action (Wang (2004,
2A.16)). In the second, Cheng adds a second example to illustrate the idea, saying that
rich people who have tasted roasted fish respond to its smell differently than poorer
people who have never tasted it (Wang (2004, 18.188)). Cheng’s hugely influential suc-
cessor Zhu Xi also uses this term in many places, in some cases even referring directly
to Cheng’s examples.17 Wang would certainly have known about Cheng and Zhu’s use
of the expression “genuine knowledge”, so their use provides further circumstantial ev-
idence that Wang could use “genuine knowledge” to describe the ideal form of knowl-
edge relevant to the unity of knowledge and action (i.e. the original natural condition
17For just a few the many instances of “genuine knowledge” in Zhu Xi, see e.g. Li &Wang (1986, 15.302,
303, 309), the last of which discusses the example of the tiger. For further discussion of these precedents in
English see Shun (2010, p. 188), Angle (2018, p. 166) and Huang (2015, Ch. 3)
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of knowledge). Since these authors did not use the expression “genuine action” in a
similarly high-profile way, their usage also provides some evidence that Wang would
in the first instance have thought of “genuineness” as distinctively associated with the
elevated form of knowledge, not the elevated form of action.
What about the original natural condition of action, which Wang here (but not in
general) describes as “genuine...action”? In the passage above, Wang begins to give a
direct positive discussion of Xu’s examples, of filiality and respect in [h]. In [h1] he
speaks of knowing filiality and knowing respect on the one hand, and enacting filiality
and enacting respect on the other. These statements are clearly intended to describe the
original natural condition of knowledge and action, and to codify the key relationship
underlying his doctrine; Wang describes not just any old knowledge of filiality and
respect, but rather genuine knowledge of filiality and respect. On the action side, Wang
has previously given no indication of how specifically to qualify the ideal form of action.
His discussion here seems designed to fill in this gap, telling us that the action relevantly
related to (genuine) knowledge of filiality is filial action and that the action relevantly
related to (genuine) knowledge of respect is respectful action. So the passage suggests
that this aspect of his doctrine connects (genuine) knowledge of filiality or respect on
the one hand, with filial and respectful action on the other. More generally, Wang’s
comments in [h] suggest that Wang understands the elevated form of action relevant to
the unity of knowledge and action as virtuous action.
3.2 AK
There is a case to be made that knowledge and action in their original natural condition
are on the one hand genuine knowledge, and, on the other, virtuous action. How does
Wang understand the relationship between these two? I will now argue, on the basis of
the examples in [g], that Wang holds that they begin at the same time. This will pave
the way for my argument that Wang endorses AK, that is, that if a person acts filially,
they genuinely know filiality.
Wang interprets the two examples from the Great Learning (quoted in [g2]) as saying
that loving a lovely sight begins no later than seeing it ([g3]) and that hating a hate-
ful odor begins no later than smelling it ([g4]). He furthermore says that seeing and
smelling “belong” to knowledge, while hating and loving “belong” to action. In what
follows, I will describe seeing, smelling, loving and hating as “stand-ins” for knowledge
and action respectively. This terminology is intended to be neutral on whether Wang
holds that these examples are themselves examples of the elevated kind of knowledge
and action he has in mind, or whether he intends themmerely as analogues for this ele-
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vated form of knowledge and action, not instances of it. Whichever waywe understand
the examples, Wang certainly holds that facts about the stand-ins help to illustrate his
views about the relationship between knowledge and action, and this will be enough
for our purposes here. In [g3-4], he says twice that the relevant stand-in for action be-
gins no later than the relevant stand-in for knowledge, suggesting that he holds that
virtuous action similarly begins no later than the relevant genuine knowledge.18
In [g5], Wang presents a different way of spelling out his example of the odor. He
describes someone who sees an object which has a bad smell, but who cannot smell
it themselves because their nose is blocked. On my preferred reading of the example,
Wang imagines that the person knows that the object they see has a bad smell, perhaps
on the basis of induction, inference, or testimony. Read in this way, the example gives a
fairly exact parallel to XuAi’s cases: this person exhibits what might seem to be a stand-
in for knowledge (they know that there is a bad odor, and hence that it isworthy of hate),
but they do not exhibit the stand-in for action (since they do not experience sensations of
hatred). AndWang gives an exactly parallel diagnosis: he says that the person does not
in fact have the kind of knowledge which interests him, presumably because they do
not know it in the right way, by smelling it. The goal of Wang’s analysis – in particular,
his identification of what counts as knowing the odor in the right way – is to defend the
idea that the stand-in for action begins no later than the stand-in for knowledge. So, in
this third example too Wang holds that the stand-in for action begins no later than the
stand-in for knowledge, providing further evidence that he would accept the claim that
virtuous action begins no later than the relevant genuine knowledge.19
18My own view is that Wang means the examples only to be analogues for knowledge and action. I do
believe that Wang himself thought that psychological or affective responses are or can be actions in their
own right (e.g. IPL 226, QJ, 109-110 (cf. QJ 32.1292-3, QJBB 323); IPL 132, QJ 46-7; see below, n. 35). But it
seems to me improbable that in the quick remarks here he means to be alluding to this relatively esoteric
aspect of his thought. If his goal had been to emphasize the non-obvious idea that the affective responses
of loving and hating are actions, we would expect him to develop this idea in the context of filiality and
respect as well. But he does not say “a personwho knows filiality is acting filially because their knowledge
is a form of action”; instead he talks about enacting filiality and enacting respect in a seemingly ordinary
way that would be misleading if he had his doctrine about mental action in mind. Note that reading the
examples as analogues is compatiblewithmany differentways of understanding “belong to” (shu yu屬於),
for instance, if we take it to mean “are” or “are a way of”. A person who is describing an allegorical work
of visual art may say “Here, the swan is the family’s prosperity”, to indicate that the swan represents the
family’s prosperity. In saying this, the person is clearly not committing themselves to the barely intelligible
claim that a swan is prosperity. Similarly, on this way of understanding shu yu, we can take Wang to be
saying that the loving and hating are actions or ways of acting given the way he is understanding the example;
this expression on its own cannot be used to resolve the question of whether Wang means to assert here
that they are (or are not) literally actions.
19On a different reading of the example, the person sees the object, but does not know that the object has
a bad smell. On this reading, Wang would also clarify that the person does not have the stand-in for action
only because they do not have the stand-in for knowledge, so he would still emphasize that action begins
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As we have seen, Wang is explicit in these examples that the stand-in for action
begins no later than the stand-in for knowledge. He does not say explicitly that the
stand-ins for action also begin no earlier than the stand-ins for knowledge, but it is fairly
clear that he would say that it does. In all three examples Wang seems to be interested
in form of “love” and “hate” that cannot antedate a person’s appropriate acquaintance
with the object of that love or hate. He does not consider the idea, for instance, that
people are born with a love of lovely sights in general or a hatred of hateful odors in
general, and that this love or hatred (a stand-in for action) precedes their perception of
any relevant sights or odors (here a stand-in for knowledge). He also does not consider
the idea that, in seeing the source of the odor or learning about the odor on the basis
of testimony, the person who knows that it is a bad odor already hates it. Instead he
emphasizes how the relevant love or hatred require the right kind of perception of the
object. Perhaps even more strikingly, Wang does not say directly that the stand-in for
action begins earlier than the stand-in for knowledge, but only that it is not true that it
begins later. This way of putting the point seems designed to lead the reader to infer
that action does not begin earlier, either.
So, to sum up: Wang says explicitly, on more than one occasion, that the stand-in
for action begins no later than the stand-in for knowledge. In the examples he uses
to illustrate this idea, it is also clear that the stand-in for action begins no earlier than
the stand-in knowledge. If one thing begins both no later and no earlier than something
else, then the twomust begin at the same time. So here the stand-ins for knowledge and
action begin at the same time, suggesting thatWang also holds that genuine knowledge
and virtuous action must also begin at the same time. This claim on its own does not
give us the full strength of Unity; Unity requires in addition that knowledge and action
no later than knowledge.
Since the upshot is the same, the difference between these readings does not a make a difference to the
points made in the main text. But I report three reasons in favor of my preferred reading. First, and most
importantly, if Wang’s point is simply that someone who has no knowledge of an odor at all may fail to
react to the odor, it is unclear why he would specify that the person sees the object and has a blocked nose.
Why not say instead that the person is far away and has no idea about the odor? Second, the alternative
reading leaves Wang’s discussion of the example open to an obvious objection. While it is true that a
person who does not know that there is an odor at all may fail to exhibit a relevant affective response,
clearly a person could know that there is a bad smell without having the relevant affective response (if
someone told them there was an odor), and in this sense they would have some form of knowledge of
the odor without hating it. If Wang did not distinguish between different ways in which one could know
about the odor (e.g. by smell as opposed to by testimony), he would leave it open that in this example too
the stand-in for knowledge and the stand-in for action could come apart. Third, the alternative reading
disrupts the parallel to Xu Ai’s cases, because the person would not have a form of knowledge parallel to
the knowledge the people in Xu’s cases had. This person would know the object which produces the odor,
but they would not know that they should hate the odor because they do not know that there is an odor.
Since it disrupts this parallel, the alternative reading makes the example less relevant to the discussion.
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end at the same time. But Wang’s remarks here do seem to support a broader picture
on which he endorses that claim, as well.
So far, it might seem, so good. But Wang’s next remarks (in [h1]) might seem im-
mediately to undercut any antecedent support for attributing Unity to him. HereWang
says that one can describe a person as (genuinely) knowing filiality or respect only if
they have in the past acted filially or respectfully. If one parses this sentence in a literal-
minded way, Wang would say explicitly that a person must have first acted filially be-
fore they acquire the relevant knowledge, flatly contradicting the claim that the relevant
knowledge and the relevant action begin at the same moment, and hence also contra-
dicting Unity itself. 20
But this literal-minded reading is not forced on us, and I believe it would be a mis-
take to endorse it. Suppose I say that you can’t appreciate the columns of Zhangjiajie,
until you’ve seen them. The sequence of tense in this statement might lead a robot to
conclude that I meant that the appreciation would start after the seeing started. But
most people would not draw this conclusion. Instead, they would recognize that my
main claim is that it is by seeing the columns that one comes to appreciate them. On this
natural reading, I would minimally not be taking a stand on whether the first moment
of seeing comes before the first moment of appreciating; and in fact I would naturally
be read as committing myself to the claim that they start simultaneously.21 On this al-
ternative, more human reading, Wang’s focus is not a claim about temporal precedence,
but instead a claim about how genuine knowledge is acquired, that is:
Means KA People come to genuinely know filiality only by acting filially.
And this claim is consistent both with Unity and – what is more relevant in the imme-
diate context – with the claim that genuine knowledge and virtuous action begin at the
same time.
Which shouldweprefer, the literal-minded reading, onwhich actionprecedes knowl-
20In light of mathematical discoveries made since Wang’s time, we now know that this would not be
a contradiction without further assumptions. For instance if the temporal extent of knowledge and ac-
tion were modeled by a single interval in the real numbers that is open on the left, then every moment
of knowledge could be preceded by a moment of action, even though every moment of action was also
simultaneous with a moment of knowledge. ButWang wouldn’t have had such ideas at his disposal, and I
think we should see him as holding that actions must have a first moment. Given this further assumption,
the literal-minded reading would indeed contradict Unity, even given what we now know.
21Another way of reconciling this remark with Wang’s earlier claim that knowledge and action begin at
the same time would be to hold that, while Wang does make the temporal claim that knowledge comes
after action, he is not committed to a universal generalization, but only to a generic claim. What he wants
to say is that, typically, we say that people know filiality only if they have acted filially. The idea would be
that Wang is simply setting aside “first moments”; if pressed he would agree that his claim does not apply
to them.
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edge, or the more human one, on which Wang asserts Means KA? Three arguments
point towards the latter. First, as we have seen, in the examples which precede this
comment, the stand-ins for action and the stand-ins for knowledge start at the same
time. Wang does not provide clear examples in which action begins before knowledge,
as one might have expected if his goal were to assert the temporal claim the literal-
minded reading attributes to him here.
Second, the three exampleswhich follow these comments – of pain, cold, and hunger
in [h2]-[h4] – fit well with a view on which Wang endorses Means KA, but not one on
which he holds that action precedes knowledge. Here, Wang says that one can know
pain, cold and hunger, only if one has been in pain, been cold or been hungry. Although
Wang uses temporal language again in these three examples, the examples themselves
seem designed to rule out the literal-minded construal of this language: it would be
at best an unusual case (if it is even possible) for someone to be in pain first, before
knowing pain, or for them to be cold or hungry first, before knowing cold or hunger.
By contrast it is natural to think that being in pain, being cold and being hungry typically
begin at the same time as one’s knowledge of pain, cold and hunger. These examples
seem designed to highlight the claim that the experience of being in pain, being cold,
or being hungry are the means by which one acquires the relevant knowledge, and
that this knowledge begins simultaneously with the experience. Since, in the context,
Wang seems to take being pained, being cold or being hungry as stand-ins for action, the
examples fairly directly make the point that one acquires relevant knowledge by acting
(i.e. by having the relevant experience). At the same time, they suggest – contrary to the
literal-minded reading – that Wang does not hold that the relevant action begins before
the relevant knowledge.22
Third and finally, Wang’s slogan itself provides us with a reason to prefer to read
him as asserting Means KA, and not as claiming the action begins before knowledge.
If Wang had wanted to claim that action comes before knowledge, why would he have
described his doctrine as “the unity of knowledge and action”, and not “action first, and
knowledge later”? The latter would have made for an equally striking contrast with
the “knowledge first, action later” slogan he attributes to Zhu Xi and his followers.
22Again, we don’t need to take a stand on whether Wang would have endorsed the claim that being
pained, being cold or being hungry are actions in propria persona; to illustrate the general idea all he needs
is for the reader to come along with him in carving up the example for present purposes in a particular way.
The broad idea in these examples that genuine knowledge requires something like first-hand experience
can also be seen in Cheng Yi’s discussion of the farmer and the tiger, as well as in Wang’s suggestion
that some knowledge is incommunicable like that of a mute person’s knowledge of the bitterness of bitter
melon (IPL 125, QJ 42). Elsewhere Wang speaks of “personally understanding” the doctrine (自知得) on
the basis of “personal experience” (就身心上體履, QJ 6.232, Ching (1972, p. 106)).
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The slogan Wang did choose suggests that he did not want to insist on the temporal
priority of action, but that he used temporal language tomake the point that knowledge
is acquired by acting.
I conclude that Wang’s apparently temporal statement in [h1] is best understood
as a claim about the role of action in acquiring knowledge, that is, as Means KA. In
endorsing Means KA, Wang seems not only to be saying that action is necessary for the
acquisition of relevant knowledge; he seems to be saying also that action suffices for
the acquisition – and hence possession – of this knowledge. While his focus in the six
illustrative examples in the passage (sight, smell, blocked nose, pain, cold, hunger) is
on the claim that knowledge and action begin at the same time, the claim that acting
suffices for acquiring relevant knowledge precludes the possibility that action could
continue after a person has stopped knowing (since the continued action would itself
be a sufficient for re-acquiring the knowledge). So, our discussion so far points to the
claim that Wang is committed to:
AK If a person is acting filially, they genuinely know filiality.
3.3 KA
This completes my case for AK. It is now time to turn to the other half of Unity, KA, that
is, if a person genuinely knows filiality, they are acting filially.
To introduce my arguments that Wang accepts KA, note first that Means KA on its
own does not provide an adequate response to Xu Ai’s challenge. Xu Ai is concerned
that people can know that they should be filial, without now being filial. Means KA
rules out the possibility that a person could now know filiality without having been filial
in the past. But it doesn’t say anything about the relationship between a person’s current
knowledge and their current ethical state: it leaves it open that a person could now
knowfiliality, because they acted filially in the past, even though they are nowno longer
even disposed so to act.
Wang’s response to Xu Ai suggests that he holds that there is a further connection
between genuine knowledge and virtuous action, which goes beyond Means KA, and
which rules this possibility. (If Wang didn’t endorse such a further principle, his re-
sponse would make little sense: he should have simply conceded that Xu’s cases were
reasonable and possible, and clarified the doctrine of unity of knowledge and action in
some other way.) Two natural candidates for such a further claim are:
General KA If a person genuinely knows filiality, they will act filially whenever they
are faced with a situation where filial action is appropriate.
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KA If a person genuinely knows filiality, they are acting filially.
These two principles rule out the problematic cases in different ways. The first says
that the possession of genuine knowledge guarantees that a person will act filially if
an opportunity arises. The second says that the only times when a person has genuine
knowledge are the times when the person is in fact acting filially.
I will now argue thatWang is committed to KA. First, I will argue for KA as opposed
to General KA as an interpretation of this passage. Second, I will provide independent
evidence thatWang endorsedKA. And finally, I will respond to an objection to the claim
that Wang endorsed KA.
My first argument centers on the claim that KA makes much better sense of Wang’s
focus on Means KA in our passage than General KA does. Means KA is naturally un-
derstood to imply that in the firstmoment ormoments that a person has genuine knowl-
edge of filiality, they must be acting (action is required for the acquisition of relevant
knowledge). Moreover, it is natural to generalize Means KA to apply to times beyond
the first moments of action or knowledge by saying that people not only acquire knowl-
edge by acting, but in general that they know filiality – i.e. persist in possessing this
knowledge – only by acting filially. It is a short step from this generalization of Means
KA to KA: since one continues to possess knowledge only by acting filially, if one knows
filiality, one is acting filially. So, if the doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action
rules out Xu Ai’s examples because it involves a commitment to KA, it is easy to make
sense of Wang’s focus in this passage on Means KA. He presents an analysis of the
first moments of knowledge and action which, if generalized to later moments as well,
would rule out Xu Ai’s examples.
By contrast, if Wang’s goal were to assert General KA, it is unclear why he would
focus on this claim about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. There is no obvious,
natural way of strengtheningMeans KA so that it would imply General KA. To see this,
suppose that you can only know the color red by seeing it. It does not follow that, later
on, since you still know the color red, you will be guaranteed to see it whenever it is
presented to you. Youmight have now lost the capacity for sight altogether. And there is
also no obvious, natural way of strengthening General KA so that it implies Means KA.
Even if genuine knowledge guarantees acting well in the appropriate circumstances, it
does not follow that one must have acted well in the past to acquire the psychological
dispositions (or whatever it might be) that guarantees acting well in the future: glasses
do not have to be broken to become fragile. These logical points do not prove that
there is no felt relationship between the principles; they are only meant to sharpen an
antecedent sense (which I hope the readerwill share) that the exact relationship between
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these principles is at best non-obvious.
This argument is contrastive: it is an argument for KA as opposed toGeneral KA. The
argument leaves it open that there might be a third principle which makes better sense
of the passage. My second argument is a more direct argument in favor of KA, based






[j] [j1] You say: “who does not know to say that filiality consists in warming
and cooling [one’s parents bed] and settling them and inquiring after [their
health]?”23 [j2] But those who can extend this knowledge [致其知] are few.
[j3] If we describe someone who roughly knows the detailed rites for how to
warm and cool, to settle and inquire after, and for this reason say that they can
extend their knowledge, then it would be admissible to say that anyone who
knows that the ruler should be humane can extend his knowledge of humane-
ness, and admissible to say that anyone who knows that the subject should
be conscientious is able to extend his knowledge of conscientiousness. Who
in the world would not extend his knowledge? [j4] If we consider the mat-
ter from this perspective, we know that extending knowledge must consist
in acting, and it is clear also that if a person is not acting then they cannot be
regarded as extending their knowledge. Is the natural condition of the unity
of knowledge and knowledge and action not still more evident now? (IPL 139
QJ 56).
In [j3], Wang speaks of the “natural condition of the unity of knowledge and action”.
This is not the same as saying “the unity of the natural condition of knowledge and
action”. But the remark suggests that Wang has the doctrine about the original natural
condition of knowledge and action in view, as opposed to his doctrine about training.
The “extension of knowledge” (致知) appears in the Great Learning – a canonical
text for those working in Wang’s philosophical tradition – on a list of eight stages in
or aspects of the development of an ethical state. Wang has a distinctive interpretation
of a number of items on this list, including the “extension of knowledge”. In fact, the
23The passage says only “warming and cooling, settling and inquiring”, but it clearly alludes to a famous
passage in the Book of Rites, “Summary of the Rules of Propriety” (曲禮上), which Legge (1885) translates
as: “ For all sons it is the rule:–Inwinter, to warm (the bed for their parents), and to cool it in summer; in the
evening, to adjust everything (for their repose), and to inquire (about their health) in the morning...” (凡為
人子之禮：冬溫而夏凊，昏定而晨省，。。。). The original text of the Rites itself does not explicitly mention
the bed of parents or their health, but Legge follows the standard traditional commentaries (which Wang
would have known) in adding these further glosses.
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standard translation “extension of knowledge” is based on Zhu Xi’s understanding of
this idea; a better rendering of the phrase given Wang’s interpretation of it might be
the “perfection of knowledge”. But this aspect of Wang’s thought will not be important
for us here. What will be important is that in many passages, Wang closely associates
this extension or perfection of knowledge with the unity of knowledge and action. In
these passages it is plausible that he uses the expression to describe the very same ele-
vated form of knowledge which he elsewhere describes as the “original natural condi-
tion of knowledge” or “genuine knowledge”.24 Here, too,Wang seems to use “extended
knowledge” (致知) in [j2], [j3] and [j4], to describe this elevated form of knowledge.
If one accepts my translation, in [j4], Wang says explicitly that extending knowledge
consists in acting, and that if a person is not acting they cannot be regarded as extending
their knowledge. On this translation, and given my claim that “extended knowledge”
denotes the same elevated form of knowledge as “genuine knowledge”, Wang asserts
KA (or, more properly, but equivalently, the contrapositive of KA): he says that if a
person is not acting, they do not have extended knowledge.
But the translation onwhich this argument relieswill be controversial. Someone one
might reject that translation and instead render the first sentence as “extending knowl-
edge depends upon acting”, and the second as “if a person has not acted, they cannot
be regarded as having extended their knowledge”. This alternative translation requires
an alternative conception of extended knowledge than the one I have presented. Per-
haps themost natural optionwould be a view onwhich extended knowledge is a stable,
long-lived state or capacity. But Wang’s remarks in [j3] reveal that in this passage he
does not think of extended knowledge in this way. In [j3] Wang repeatedly contrasts
someone who merely knows how to say the right words about virtue with the state of a
person who “can extend his knowledge” of humaneness or conscientiousness. In these
remarks, the relevant stable state is not one of having extended one’s knowledge but
rather of being able to extend it. This discussion suggests that while a virtuous person is
able to extend their knowledge, they will not do so all the time, but only when the oc-
casion calls for it. In this context, the translation I’ve given for [j4], according to which
the occasion for a person’s extending their knowledge is the occasion of acting virtu-
ously, is far more natural than the alternative. And, as I have said, on this translation,
and given my earlier claim that “extended knowledge” here denotes the same elevated
24 Perhaps most notably, see QJ 5.211 Ching (1972, p. 68-9)) (cf. QJ 27. 1100 where the same point is
made almost verbatim). But cf. also IPL 139 QJ 56; IPL 140, QJ 58; IPL 321, QJ 137; QJ 8.308. Note that,
while I think it is natural to take instances of “extended knowledge” to denote genuine knowledge, when
Wang explicitly associates this term with the unity of knowledge and action, I do not think that every use
of “extended knowledge” denotes this elevated form of knowledge.
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form of knowledge which Wang elsewhere calls “genuine knowledge”, Wang endorses
KA.25
So the hypothesis that Wang endorses KA not only makes better sense of his em-
phasis on Means KA in [T3] than General KA does, it also receives independent sup-
port from [T4]. The case that Wang endorses this principle is strong. But there is an
important objection which might seem to undermine this case. The objection is based
on the fact that in the key passage [h1] in [T3]Wang says that a person knows filiality
only after they have acted filially, and that they know respect only after they have acted
respectfully. These claims (along with those in [h2]-[h4]) seem designed to allow the
reader to infer that there is a form of knowledge which persists after the initial action,
and thus that there are times when a person knows but does not act, contradicting KA.
In reply to this objection, I want to suggest that there are two ways of speaking
about knowledge relevant to this passage. Compare a person who is now experiencing
hunger with a person who is now recalling what it feels like to be hungry (or who is
merely capable of recalling this sensation). There is a reasonable way of using “know
hunger” – which I will call the “expansive sense” – on which it applies to both of these
people. But there is also a reasonable way of using this expression – which I will call
the “restrictive sense” – on which only the person who is currently hungry counts as
knowing hunger. (Some may find the example of “know poverty” more compelling:
a person who is no longer poor has known poverty in the relevant sense, but they do
not know it any longer.) In my view, when Wang says that ka person knows filiality
only after they have acted filially, inviting the reader to infer that knowledge persists
after action, he should be understood as using “know” in the expansive sense: people
continue to know filiality in the sense of being able to recall the sensation of being filial,
after they have acted filially. But he can also use this expression in the restrictive sense,
and in this sense, which is the one relevant to KA, knowledge of filiality does not persist
after filial action.
This interpretation has significant costs. It requires postulating adistinction inWang’s
usage that Wang himself does not make explicit. Moreover, it requires claiming that
Wang is not talking about themost important form of knowledge for the unity of knowl-
edge and action in [h1], the key remarks on how genuine knowledge relates to virtuous
action. But I believe that these costs must be paid. Every reasonable alternative inter-
25In the face of this second argument alone, onemight questionmy claim that “extended knowledge” can
denote the same elevated form of knowledge as “genuine knowledge”, claiming that Wang uses genuine
knowledge in the way described in General KA, and extended knowledge in the way described in KA. But
this position would still face the challenge raised in my first argument for KA as opposed to General KA,
since that argument applied to General KA as a description of genuine knowledge.
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pretation I have been able to think of fails to satisfy other, more important demands
which I have emphasized already.
For example, while General KA can make sense of the idea that a person continues
to have knowledge in Wang’s most favored sense after having acted filially, we have
seen that Wang’s comments in the passage simply do not explain how a person’s first
experience of filial action would be required for (or, even more oddly, sufficient for) the
acquisition of something like a disposition to act filially in appropriate circumstances.
As I have said, it is not by breaking that glasses become fragile. Moreover – and equally
importantly – in [T4], Wang endorses an analogue of KA for “extended knowledge”,
which I have suggested is the same formof elevated knowledge he elsewhere calls “gen-
uine knowledge”. Any view which rejects KA in [T3] will struggle to explain Wang’s
endorsement of an analogue of KA for this closely related notion.
So, while acknowledge that my interpretation of Wang’s comments in [h1] has sig-
nificant costs, it is still the best overall interpretation of his remarks that I have been
able to find. Since no other interpretation seems to me to do better, I believe we should
attribute KA to Wang.
I have argued that, in [T3], Wang is best understood as committed to AK and KA.
Since the conjunction of these principles is equivalent to Unity, if he is committed to
them, he is also committed to Unity.
As presaged in the introduction, in arguing for the claim that Wang is committed to
Unity I have largely treated “knowledge” and “action” as placeholders. I have not taken
a stand on many controversial questions about how Wang substantively understands
these notions. But the conclusion that Wang is committed to Unity is a striking result,
which tightly constrains how onemight develop a fuller interpretation ofWang’s views
about knowledge and action. To see this point, note that on the usual way of thinking
about (propositional) knowledge, such knowledge is a long-lasting state. If Wei knows
that the capital of Tang was Chang’an, he still knows this even when he is not thinking
about this question, and in fact even if he is asleep or unconscious. But clearly if Wei
is unconscious and not moving, he is not acting in any familiar sense. So, given KA,
he cannot have genuine knowledge. Genuine knowledge thus must be quite different
from propositional knowledge understood in this usual way, if Wang accepts Unity.
Unity thus imposes substantive constraints on the interpretation ofWang’s views about
(genuine) knowledge and action.
The arguments I have given for this substantive constraint do not employ premises
about the broader interpretation of Wang’s views on knowledge and action. They are
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based on claims of detail about particular passages. These arguments can be accepted
by those who endorse a wide array of “big picture” views about the aims of Wang’s
doctrines. And, moreover, those who wish to challenge the arguments cannot do so
only by offering a big picture which conflicts with Unity; theymust engage as well with
the detailed arguments based on these particular texts.
4 Identity
The English word “unity” might naturally suggest to some readers that Wang has in
mind not only the idea that the original natural condition of knowledge occurs if and
only if the original natural condition of action does, but a much stronger claim as well:
that knowledge and action are in some sense the very same thing. We can make this
idea more precise, using the key terms which also appear in Unity, as follows:
Identity To genuinely know filiality just is to act filially.26
Here I use “just is” to denote a symmetric relation, so that Identity is equivalent to the
claim that to act filially just is to genuinely know filiality. Unity says that a person gen-
uinely knows filiality if and only if they act filially. Identity says that genuinely knowing
filiality and acting filially are the very same thing. If genuinely knowing filiality is the
very same thing as acting filially, then a person will genuinely know filiality if and only
if they they act filially; Identity entails Unity. But Unity does not entail Identity: it does
not follow from the fact that one thing occurs if and only if another does, that the two
are identical.
Proponents of Identity should see my arguments that Wang endorses Unity as for
the most part friendly: Unity gets us part of the way to Identity. But they will want
to argue that Unity is not enough, and that the full extent of the relationship Wang
postulates between the original natural conditions of knowledge and action can only be
captured by Identity. In this section I will argue against this view. I’ll first present two
direct arguments against the claim that Wang endorses Identity, and then I’ll consider
two ways one might attempt to argue for Identity, and argue that neither is successful.27
26Huang (2017, p. 75) is one of the most explicit endorsements I know of.
27My discussion of Identity is inspired in part by Warren Frisina’s discussion of the principle, primarily
in his Frisina (1989) essentially reprinted in his Frisina (2002). I will quote Frisina below in support of my
suggestions for how an interpretation which attributes this principle to Wang might look. But I want to
emphasize from the outset that it is not clear that Frisina is himself a wholehearted proponent of Identity,
or even the spirit behind that principle. Frisina introduces the project of Frisina (1989) by saying: “My
aim is to demonstrate that Wang intended his phrase literally. Knowledge and action are, in all their forms,
really one thing” (Frisina (1989, p. 419), emphasis his). In the preface of Frisina (2002), he writes: “...I was
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My first argument against attributing Identity to Wang is a conceptual one. If, as
Identity says, to genuinely knowfiliality is to act filially, then presumably if a person acts
filially, their acting filially must be identical to their genuinely knowing filiality. But this
last claim is implausible. The sage-kingWu famously raised an armywithoutmourning
his parents, an action that was considered filial in spite of its apparent unfiliality (for
Wang’s discussion of the example see IPL 139 QJ 57). Was this filial action identical to
Wu’s genuinely knowing filiality? It is just incredible to say that it was. Wu’s action
of raising the army consisted of many component actions: of sending messengers to
rouse the troops, of riding from place to place with his generals, or of marching with
the army. These actions are not identical to anything understood as knowing in any
ordinary sense of that term. One can understand a conception of action on which his
actions had various mental states or activities as parts (and also on which the mental
events themselves were actions, see n. 35), but surely his actions involved a great deal
more than this: he had to move his mouth, leap onto his horse, and move his legs as he
marched.
Arguments based on the intrinsic plausibility of a given position cannot be decisive
in determining what Wang Yangming believed; it is possible that Wang endorsed im-
plausible positions. But the obviousness of this style of counterexample does place the
burden of proof squarely on the shoulders of proponents of Identity. The textual evi-
dence would have to be strongly in favor of Identity if we were to attribute it to Wang,
given how evident the counterexamples to it are. If Wang did endorse this radical po-
sition, one would at the very least expect him to have described why he thought such
counterexamples are not in fact counterexamples, as a way of explaining the position
he does hold. But we find no such explanation in the surviving texts.
Someonemight seek to resist this argument by claiming that itmisrepresentsWang’s
aims as a philosopher. They might say that Wang’s goal in endorsing Identity is not to
inspired by the philosophy underlying the Neo-Confucian scholar Wang Yang-ming’s famous slogan chih
hsing ho-i (the unity of knowledge and action). Though it sounds strange at first I have come to believe that
he meant us to take this slogan literally. For Wang, knowledge is a way of acting. To say that we know
something is really a statement about howwe interact with it...” (Frisina (2002, p. 4)). But, in spite of these
remarks, I am unsure whether Frisina endorses Identity. When he spells out his thesis in more detail, he
does not stick to the letter of the claim that knowledge and action are, “in all their forms, one thing”. At
the end of the previous quotation, for instance, Frisina seems to say only that knowledge is constituted
not by a single action but by a pattern of action, precluding the claim that any particular action could be
identical to knowledge of an object. Frisina also makes this point in the paper, writing: “Knowledge is not
a ‘representation the world,’ but a pattern of behavior, a way of being in the world. To know something
is to react to it in a way that takes it into account” (Frisina (1989, p. 420)). Here knowledge of objects
is identified with “a pattern of behavior”, not with any particular action: not all actions are identical to
knowledge. So although I will describe Frisina below as attributing this principle to Wang, I do not think
it is obvious that he does believe that Wang endorses the principle.
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offer a theory of the nature of knowledge and action, but instead to reform the concepts
we use to think about our ethical lives. On this picture, the fact that Wang does not
consider the kind of example I’ve just described could be seen as evidence in favor of
the claim that Wang does not aim to describe knowledge and action. Such examples,
based on the common-sense notions of knowledge and action, are irrelevant to Wang’s
project, which precisely involves reforming those common-sense concepts.
But, first, while this response may escape the letter of the argument, it does not es-
cape the spirit of it. Even if the response were to succeed in showing that such examples
are not counterexamples toWang’s doctrine properly understood, it would not succeed
in showing that the examples are irrelevant toWang’s project. Given the obviousness of
examples like the one above, where King Wu’s actions are not knowledge in any sense,
Wang would still owe his students an explanation of how, on his proposed conceptual
reform, this kind of example is no longer concerning – how exactly are knowledge and
action now to be understood so that these examples either do not count as actions or do
count as knowledge? In my view, this first point is sufficient to show that the response
fails. But the response also has a second problem, since the methodological remarks I
discussed in detail in section 2 undermine the idea behind it. As we saw, Wang there
contrasts the fact that his doctrine was developed as a therapeutic measure, with the
fact that his doctrine concerns the original natural condition of knowledge and action.
By far the most natural reading of those remarks is that Wang endorses a straightfor-
ward distinction between the primarily practical aspects of his doctrine, and those as-
pects which are concerned with describing reality. If Wang’s doctrine about the original
natural condition of knowledge and action is meant as a primarily practical one, a con-
ceptual reformwhich is intended to remedy people’s moral defects by a radical form of
mental therapy, the contrast Wang draws in those passages would make no sense.
A second argument against attributing Identity toWang is textual. It is based on the




[d] [The Master said:] “But this is to lose [sight of] the purpose [宗旨] of the
ancients. [d1] I have said that knowledge is themain goal (主意) of action, and
that action is the training (or: “effort” 功夫) of knowledge, [d2] that knowl-
edge is the beginning of action, and action is the completion of knowledge.
[d3] If you understand correctly, then as soon as you speak of knowledge,
action will automatically already be included, and as soon as you speak of ac-
tion, knowledge will automatically already be included...(IPL 5, QJ 5 cf. IPL
29
26, QJ 15)28
In context, it is clear that Wang’s remarks about knowledge being the beginning
and action coming later concern the original natural condition of knowledge and ac-
tion. These remarks come immediately after Xu Ai’s question in [c] of [T2], which, as I
argued at the end of section 2, divides the doctrine of the unity of knowledge and ac-
tion fairly explicitly into one part concerning the original natural condition and another
concerning training. In response to this question, Wang starts by saying that one must
be clear about the ancients’ purpose. But before clarifying their purpose (in the passage
immediately following this), he pauses parenthetically to restate his own view about
the original natural condition of knowledge and action.29
So in the two key sentences, Wang ascribes properties to knowledge in its original
natural condition, which action in its original natural condition lacks (being the begin-
ning, being the guiding aim), and ascribes properties to action in its original natural
condition (being the completion, being the training) which knowledge in its original
natural condition lacks. But if two things have different properties, they are not identi-
cal. So, iknowledge and action are not identical.30
28There are three ways of taking the beginning of the passage ([d1]), depending on how we understand
yi意 there. On a first interpretation (represented in my translation),意 is taken as “goal” or “aim” (Wang
uses the word in this way twice in [b3] of [T2], which comes just before our passage). His idea is that
one’s action aims at knowledge, and acting is the process of fulfilling that aim, so that the best forms of
knowledge and action are jointly realized. On a second interpretation, yi means “inclination” and Wang
speaks here of one or moremental events that last through the action and guide it. (So, Chen (1991, p. 101),
and also Angle & Tiwald (2017, p. 131), who translate this “intent of acting”.) On a third interpretation,
my “main goal” (zhu yi主意) is instead understood as “master” (zhu zai主宰), which is in turn associated
with liangzhi (良知) (Wu (2018, p. 21)).
The difference between these interpretations will not matter much in what follows. My main reason for
preferring the first here is that Wang elsewhere also draws a contrast between the “main goal” zhu yi主意
and “training” gong fu功夫/工夫 in a context where it clearly has nothing to do with a particular person’s
psychological state, and where it is also clear that zhu yi主意 is not to be taken as “master” (IPL 25, QJ 15;
IPL 168, QJ 80-1).
29The best construal of the related remarks in IPL 26 (QJ 15) is similar: the first remarks there concern
original natural condition, while the later ones concern training.
30For this argument, see also Chen (1991, p. 99), Lee (1994, p. 423). Frisina (1989, p. 421) recognizes the
problem but does not offer a reading of the passages that fits with his interpretation. There are, however,
some substantive responses in the literature. Huang (2017, pg. 73) suggests an ingenious reinterpretation
of [d2], on which it should be read as “[the beginning of] knowledge is the beginning of action; [the com-
pletion of action] is the completion of knowledge”. On this view, [d2] would be consistent with Identity.
But the reading requires what is in my view a fairly extreme interpolation, and in any case, it does not ex-
plain away the remark in [d1], where Wang also attributes further different properties to knowledge and
action (being the guiding aim vs. being training). Wu (2011, p. 103) offers a different kind of diagnosis,
suggesting that in his later years, Wang would no longer have accepted this (earlier) remark, and that in
those later years he did endorse something like Identity. This position deserves further consideration, but
as indicated in n. 4 I am here exploring how we should understand Wang’s views on the assumption they
were consistent after 1509.
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It might seem, however, that the passage threatens more than just Identity. Wang’s
remarks about “beginning” and “completion” on their own could be read as describing
a temporal relationship (knowledge comes first, and action later), or a conceptual one
(knowledge is in some sense conceptually prior; action is in some sense conceptually
posterior). If the temporal reading were the correct one, this passage would be incom-
patible with Unity as well as Identity.31 But in context, the latter, conceptual reading
is clearly to be preferred. First, Wang immediately goes on to say that, whenever one
speaks of knowledge, action is present, and whenever one speaks of action, knowledge
is present. These remarks conflict with a temporal interpretation ofWang’s earlier com-
ment: if knowledge came first, and action later, then one could imagine the knowledge
pre-existing and being stopped prior to the action, so that there would be circumstances
in which one could speak of knowledge without speaking of action. Second, Wang else-
where presents his main opponent as someone who holds that knowledge comes first
and action later (IPL 137QJ 54, IPL 140QJ 58,QJ 8.309,QJ 32.1331). It would be odd if he
then asserted here that in fact knowledge comes first and action later. As Chen (1991, p.
101) points out (though he defends the temporal reading), we would be left to wonder
what was distinctive about Wang’s own view. Third, and most powerfully, in every
single example Wang considers in [T3] (which comes earlier in this same passage) – the
examples of the odor, sight, filiality, respect, pain, cold, and hunger – he emphasizes
explicitly that action begins no later than knowledge. It would be bizarre if, in closing
that passage, he undid all of his earlier work, and affirmed that knowledge does, after
all, come before action. In short, there is strong reason to understand his comments
as indicating conceptual, not temporal priority, and on this reading the comments are
consistent with Unity. 32
In any case, if this passage is inconsistent with Unity, then it is a fortiori inconsistent
with Identity. If one acceptsmy arguments that the passage should be read in away that
31For the temporal reading see e.g. Lao (2019 (1984-6), 3.422), who claims that all Wang intends is to
defend the claim that the source of knowledge and action are the same (which he calls “the sourcemeaning”
根源意義). For criticism, see Chen (2015, p. 9), and now Chen (2019, p. 126-132).
32One might attempt to save the temporal reading of “beginning” and “completion” by elucidating
a sense of conceptual containment which does not require temporal coincidence. One could imagine a
philosopher saying that speaking of a seed involves speaking of a tree, even though the tree does not exist
yet. Similarly, onemight think thatWang could be saying that speaking of knowledgewould in some sense
involve speaking of action, even though the action does not exist yet. But this response, while ingenious,
still falls foul of the second and third argument in the main text.
Chen (2015, p. 7 and 9) (now Chen (2019, pg. 126-32)) develops a version of this view, on which the
sense of knowledge relevant here is a capacity which develops into action. It is unclear to me whether
Chen ultimately sees this view as supporting Identity, or whether he in fact accepts that even Unity should
be rejected (since he holds that time-differences between knowledge and action are admissible provided
they are “homogeneous”.
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is consistent with Unity, it is still inconsistent with Identity. So either way the passage
provides evidence against Identity. In fact, I think the passage is about as clear as they
come in the surviving works of Wang Yangming. Together with the first conceptual
argument against attributing Identity to Wang, it presents a powerful case that Wang
did not endorse Identity.
These arguments are strong, but they might not be conclusive. If there were strong
countervailing evidence in favor of the claim that Wang does endorse Identity, one
might be led by that evidence on balance still to attribute Identity to Wang, and to find
someway of explaining away our passages. In the remainder of the section, then, I want
to consider what seem to me the two strongest arguments that Wang endorses Identity.
I will argue that neither of these arguments succeeds.
The first argument is perhaps the more prominent of the two, but it is also the
weaker. It is based on the claim that the literal reading of “unity” in the slogan “the
unity of knowledge and action” is as “identity”.33 I agree that the expression heyi 合
一 can mean “identity”. But the expression has a much broader semantic range; it can
also something more like “correspondence”, “correlation”, or “co-occurrence”. So on
its own the fact that Wang uses合一 is not evidence that Wang endorses Identity in ad-
dition to Unity. Both Unity and Identity accord with literal readings of the slogan (cf.
Chen (1991, p. 96) for a similar point).
A second argument is more challenging. It is based on a family of passages in which
Wang repeats a set phrase, which we saw above in [T1]. As I will discuss, there are two
natural interpretations of this phrase, one of which directly supports Identity, and the
other of which does not. In the remainder of the section, I will consider this phrase
in detail and argue that the evidence favors the second interpretation, which does not
support Identity. My argument for this conclusion will be a little involved; those who
are content with the arguments I have already given against Identity may wish to skip
to the next section at this point.
Below I print this difficult set phrase, with two different translations. The (A) trans-
lation corresponds to an interpretation which supports Identity; the (B) translation cor-
responds to my preferred alternative (printed in my translation of the phrase in [T1]
above):
[T6] 知之真切篤實處，即是行︔行之明覺精察處，即是知。
33Frisina’s repeated insistence that his attribution of something like Identity to Wang derives from a
“literal reading” of Wang Yangming seems an instance of this argument. “My aim is to demonstrate that
Wang intended his phrase literally” (Frisina (1989, p. 419) cf. pp. 420, 421, 424, 433, 442, all using the word
“literal”.).
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(A) Insofar as knowledge is genuine, practical, earnest and effective, it is ac-
tion; insofar as action is lucid, perceptive, focused and discriminating, it is
knowledge.
(B) The genuine, earnest, practical and effective aspects of knowledge are [a
matter of] action; the lucid, perceptive, focused, discriminating aspects of ac-
tion is [a matter of] knowledge.
The main difference between the (A) translation and the (B) translation concerns
how the expression zhi chu X之 Y處 is rendered (“insofar as X is Y” vs. “the Y aspects
of X”). As a consequence of this difference, the two translations differ also in how they
take the phrase即是 “just is”. The (A) translation renders it literally as “is” or “just is”,
while the (B) translation takes it a little more loosely as “is a matter of”. This less literal
use of ji shi has parallels in English. One can well imagine a baseball coach instructing
a player while watching an expert pitcher. “Do you see the spin on that curveball? It’s
his ring finger”. In the (B) translation, as in this English sentence, the idea would be
that Wang is indicating the cause or explanation of the relevant qualities.
Given our earlier discussion it is natural to think that for knowledge to be in its orig-
inal natural condition just is for it to be genuine, practical, earnest and effective (recall:
“genuine knowledge”), and for action to be in its original natural condition of action
just is for it to be lucid, perceptive, focused and discriminating. On this assumption,
the (A) interpretation directly supports Identity. By contrast, the (B) translation does
not support Identity. Wang’s idea would be something we might more fully express as
“knowledge’s being genuine, practical, earnest and substantial comes from its associa-
tion with action; action’s being lucidly aware and precisely discriminating comes from
its association with knowledge”.
These translations each seem about equally plausible to me linguistically. Some
might think that, owing to the fact that it is more literal, the (A) translation has a de-
fault presumption in its favor. But that is not obvious to me: Wang often uses emphatic
language non-literally even in theoretical contexts. We must look to the context of the
set phrase for help. And the context for three of the four passages where Wang uses
the phrase supports (as I will now argue) the (B) translation rather than the (A) transla-
tion. (The fourth, from a letter to Zhou Daotong周道通,QJ 32.1331, doesn’t point either
way.)
Let us begin with [T1], where Wang uses the phrase in the opening of his response
to Gu Dongqiao’s challenge ([a1]). First, immediately after using the set phrase, in [a2],
Wang says “The training of knowledge and action at its basis cannot be separated”. This
suggests that he sees the point he has just made, in the set phrase, as closely related to
the fact that the training of knowledge and action is one and the same. The (B) reading
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of the set phrase makes better sense of this connection: if Wang is saying that achieving
or maintaining the ideal qualities of knowledge (respectively, action) is a matter of ac-
tion (respectively, knowledge) then he is essentially saying that the training for one of
these must be training for the other. Second, and much more strikingly, a few sentences
later (in [a4]), Wang approvingly quotes Gu (who seems to be quotingWang himself) as
saying that: “genuine knowledge is just what is employed in performing an action; if a
person does not act it is not worthy to be called knowledge” (真知即所以爲行，不行不
足謂之知). This statement strongly suggests that Wang believes genuine knowledge is
distinct from action: “what is employed in performing action” cannot be action itself.
Moreover, the quotation supports precisely the picture described by the (B) translation:
Wang says that the fact that the knowledge is genuine is a matter of the action the per-
son takes when they have this knowledge. The (A) translation, by contrast, does not fit
well with the passage as a whole. If we accept that translation, Wang starts by asserting
an identity, but then takes it back moments later when he says that genuine knowledge
is what is employed in performing the action.34
The second and third passages whereWang uses the set phrase, both come from the
same 1526 letter, “In reply to inquiries from a friend”. The first use of the phrase in
the letter (QJ 6. 232 (Ching (1972, p. 106)) comes at the end of a discussion of learning
(xue 學). After expanding on the set phrase in a few sentences, Wang concludes his
discussion “originally it is one training” (元來只是一箇工夫). So here too, Wang uses
the set phrase to develop a point about how these ideal conditions of knowledge and
action are acquired ormaintained: his focus is on the unity of the training for knowledge
and action, not onwhether the state of having the ideal conditions is the very same thing.
Once again, since the (B) translation fits better with an emphasis on training than the
(A) translation does, we should prefer it here.





The genuine, practical, earnest and effective aspects of knowledge are [a mat-
34This argument isn’t quite as conclusive as I would like. If Wang had written真知即所以行, this would
uncontroversiallymean that genuine knowledge is used in guiding action; it iswhat is used to act. Butwhat
he did write,真知即所以為行 has three different possible construals. If we read wèi here, it means (i) that
genuine knowledge is used to promote action. If we read wéi it most likely means something like (ii) that
genuine knowledge is employed in acting. But it is perhaps just possible that the expression linguistically
could mean (iii) that genuine knowledge constitutes action. Since this interpretation is less natural than
the alternatives, it would still be a mark against attributing Identity to Wang that it requires adopting it.
34
ter of] action; the lucid, perceptive, focused and discriminating aspects of ac-
tion are [a matter of] knowledge. If when you are [engaged in] knowing,
your mind is unable to be genuine, practical, earnest and effective, then your
knowledge will not be able to be lucid, perceptive, focused and discriminat-
ing; it is not that when you are [engaged in] knowing you only need to be
lucid, perceptive, focused and discriminating, but don’t also need to be gen-
uine, practical, earnest and effective. If when you are acting, your mind is un-
able to be lucid, perceptive, focused, and discriminating, then your actionwill
not be able to be genuine, practical, earnest and effective; it’s not that when
you are acting, you only need to be genuine, practical, earnest and effective,
but don’t also need to be lucid, perceptive, focused and discriminating. (QJ
6.234, Ching (1972, p. 108))
The Zhong Yong speaks of earnest action (篤行) (not earnest knowledge); it was also
common to speak of lucid or discriminating knowledge (not luminous or discriminating
action) (cf. e.g. Li & Wang (1986, 14.281)). A key aspect of Wang’s set phrase is that it
reverses these typical attributes of ideal knowledge and action. In the present passage
Wang offers a kind of explanation for why he has performed this reversal: he holds that
knowledge can’t have its typically valedictory properties unless it is associated with
an action which has its typical valedictory properties. But if this is right, then Wang’s
overall point seems to be a familiar one: that the training of knowledge and action can’t
be separated, because the ideal form of knowledge can only be acquired andmaintained
through action, and the ideal form of action can only be achieved through knowledge.
While this point is perhaps consistent with the (A) translation, it is better captured by
the (B) translation. And there is a further point in favor of the (B) reading here as well,
a point which concerns what Wang does not say as opposed to what he does. In the
closing sentence of the excerpt, Wang does not say “if when you are acting, your mind
is unable to be lucid...then since the lucidity of your mind is the lucidity of your action, your
action will not be able to be genuine...”. Without this kind of comment, his remark is
much more naturally read as indicating that a person must have one set of qualities if
they are to have the other, not that having one set of them just is having the other. So on
balance, this passage too, it seems to me, favors the (B) translation above.
To sumup: the contextswhereWang uses the set phrase favor the (B) translation and
interpretation. In those passages, Wang is concerned to argue that one cannot achieve
the ideal properties of knowledge without achieving the ideal qualities of action (and
vice versa). He does not seem concerned to argue that knowledge is identical to action,
by any means – in one of the passages he even makes a remark which is flatly inconsis-
tent with their identity. So these passages do not support attributing Identity to Wang.
They certainly do not provide the kind of conclusive evidence in its favor that would
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be required to overcome the strong presumption against Identity generated by my first
two arguments.
5 Conclusion
The doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action has two components: one concerning
the training of knowledge and action, and one concerning their original natural condi-
tion (Section 2). Wang says that the training of knowledge and action are unified in the
sense that they are one and the same. But he does not hold that knowledge and ac-
tion are identical in their original natural condition (Section 4). Instead, using “genuine
knowledge” and various forms of virtuous action for knowledge and action in their
original natural conditions, I have argued that he endorses claims of the form (Section
3):
Unity A person genuinely knows filiality if and only if they are acting filially.
I have not argued that Unity is the only claim that Wang accepts as part of his doc-
trine about the original natural condition of knowledge and action. I am open to the
idea that Wang endorses other claims, in addition to Unity.35 But I reject the claim that
35There are several further claims which I think are especially worth exploring:
Knowledge is Action Every episode of knowledge is an action.
Knowledge is a Part of Action All episodes of genuine knowledge of filiality are part of a filial action.
Action has Knowledge as a Part All filial action has episodes of genuine knowledge of filiality as a part.
The most promising lines of thought in support of attributing these claims to Wang rest on two key ideas.
First, in two passages (IPL 132, QJ 47; IPL 226, QJ 109-10 (cf. QJ 32.1292-3, with QJBB 323, the variant in
the 續傳習錄 (Shu (2017, p. 2090)) with Wu (2018, p. 16)), Wang seems to say that inclinations (yi 意) or
concerns (nian 念) are actions or are parts of actions, suggesting (i) that all inclinations and all concerns
are actions. Second, in a family of other passages (IPL 6 QJ 6; IPL 78 QJ 27; IPL 137 QJ 53; IPL 174 QJ
86-7; IPL 201 QJ 103), Wang describes knowledge as intimately related to inclinations意. In two, he says
that “insofar as an inclination is lively and lucid, it is knowledge” (指意之靈明處謂之知 IPL 201, QJ 103,
cf. also IPL 174 QJ 86-7), suggesting (ii) that all episodes of knowledge are inclinations. These two claims
immediately imply Knowledge is Action. (Indeed, the set phrase discussed in the previous section may
provide further support for this claim, since the expression “lively and lucid” which Wang says qualifies
those inclinations that are knowledge also appears qualifying action in that phrase.)
For Knowledge is a Part of Action: I argued above that even if Wang holds that some mental events
are actions, it is plausible that he does not think that purely mental (non-bodily) actions always suffice for
virtuous action: some virtuous actions require an associated physical performance. Given this, episodes
of genuine knowledge of filiality are not in general identical with filial actions (although they might be
identical with actions). But while they may not be identical with actions, they could be guaranteed to be
parts of such actions.
For Action has Knowledge as a Part: given Unity, filial action requires that the person exhibit genuine
knowledge of filiality. Wang’s idea that inclinations are parts of actions shows that he happily includes
mental events associated with an action as part of the action itself. And this general thought naturally
leads to the idea that the genuine knowledge that accompanies filiality is a part of the filial action.
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Wang endorses Identity, and I believe, moreover, that Unity is a core part of Wang’s
distinctive views about the relationship between knowledge and virtuous action.
In key remarks about the unity of knowledge and action, Wang makes some ap-
parently radical methodological claims. He says that his doctrine was proposed as a
remedy for the ethical sickness of his day, and he says that if a student does not un-
derstand the practical implications of his position (or, “its purpose”), it does not matter
whether they assert his doctrine or its negation ([T2] [b3-4]). These remarks might seem
to suggest that Wang does not view his doctrine as an accurate description of knowl-
edge and action. And this suggestion might lead one to go further: one might hold
that Wang does not aim to describe knowledge or action, but instead to develop new
concepts which he believed would, if inculcated in the right way, help people to get
themselves to be virtuous.
I have argued that – at least in the case of the unity of knowledge and action – such
a radical conception of Wang’s aims not only has no textual basis, but is in fact under-
mined by the very methodological remarks which might have inspired it. Wang draws
a stark contrast between the fact that his doctrine was proposed in order to remedy the
ills of his day, and the fact that it describes knowledge and action in their original nat-
ural condition. He is clear that he takes his doctrine to accurately describe this original
natural condition.
Of course, it is possible that Wang fails to live up to this aim. It is possible that in
So there is some case to be made in support of attributing these principles to Wang. But the case is far
from watertight. The passages in which Wang describes the metaphysics of knowledge (most notably IPL
174QJ 86-7; IPL 201QJ 103) are not explicitly connected to Wang’s doctrines about the unity of knowledge
and action. Two of the clearest passages in which Wang associates mental events with action (IPL 132,
QJ 47; IPL 226, QJ 109-10) are connected to the unity of knowledge and action, but they are explicitly
associated with the training part of his doctrine, not with the original natural condition of knowledge and
action. (In the first (IPL 132) Wang explicitly addresses training; in the second (IPL 226) Wang connects
his point about concerns (nian 念) to the “guiding aim” (zong zhi 宗旨) of the unity of knowledge and
action was to get people to realize that concerns are actions, again suggesting his focus is on the practical
dimension of the doctrine.) So even if Wang does endorse these additional principles, the evidence favors
the idea that he would not have taken them to be part of his doctrine about the original natural condition
of knowledge and action. Second, there is no similar line of argument that Wang endorses the claim that
all actions are inclinations or concerns, and also no case that Wang holds that all inclinations or concerns
are episodes of knowledge. So even if Wang endorses the claims above, he would not be committed to the
claim that all actions are episodes of knowledge (i.e. the position is consistent with rejecting Identity). This
claim is important, since some who have made much of Wang’s interest in mental action have suggested
that, if Wang did think that an affect-like mental event was identical with a knowledge-like event, this
would suffice for him to hold that knowledge and action are the very same thing (most notably, Huang
(2017, p. 76), Huang (2020)). But it wouldn’t, unless Wang also held (counterintuitively and without
explicit argument) that the only actions are mental actions. Third, the evidence in favor of (ii) needs closer
examination. It is clear that Wang thinks that every episode of knowledge is somehow associated with an
inclination, but it is not clear that he thinks they are identical. The strongest point in favor of (ii) seems tome
in QJ 32.1292-3, where Wang says that when a concern (念) arises, it is knowledge, not that all knowledge
is like this. I hope to consider this kind of evidence in more detail elsewhere.
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putting forward Unity, Wang analyzes something as “knowledge” or “action” which
does not resemble anything a reasonable person could mean by either of those terms.
Perhaps most obviously, what I have said here leaves it open that Wang understands
“genuine knowledge” as an aspect of the mind completely different from what might
be reasonably called “knowledge”. Elsewhere I argue that Wang does mean something
reasonably understood as “knowledge” by “genuine knowledge” (Lederman (2020b,a)).
But even if he does not, that fact would not show that he did not aim to describe knowl-
edge and action; people often fail to live up to their aims.
In discussing Wang’s aims as a philosopher I have focused on whether he aimed to
describe the nature of knowledge and action, or whether he was engaged in some kind
of conceptual engineering. But this question bears on a second one: whether Wang
was in any sense a systematic thinker. Tu Wei-ming is characteristically eloquent in
presenting the problem:
It is not to be wondered that there exist many constructions of Wang Yang-
ming’s philosophy. One is easily led to believe that the datum itself is of
such a plastic nature that without much artificial effort it can be shaped into
a variety of designs according to the intentions of the designers. Howmuch
is this attributable to Yang-ming’s own decision to discourage any system-
atization of his ideas remains an open question. But the act of constructing
a philosophical edifice for Yang-ming cannot be justifiedmerely on grounds
that such an intellectual game has been widely and continuously practiced.
…I am increasingly suspicious of the claim that the reconstruction of Yang-
ming’s philosophy involves no more than the procedure of integrating his
basic precepts into a rational system. Nor do I accept the presumption that
the content of Yang-ming’s thought can be encapsulated in a more or less
rigorously related set of formulas. For I cannot endorse the optimism that,
once the blue-print of Yang-ming’s philosophical edifice is dissected and an-
alyzed, the task of reconstruction can be painlessly accomplished by a group
of professional builders. (Tu (1973, p. 187))
Tu is careful here not to commit himself to the claim that there is no interesting sys-
tematic theory underlyingWang Yangming’s thought. But his remarks strongly suggest
skepticism that Wang’s thought had any “inner logic”. Tu seems to see this as a good
thing: he sees the lack of an inner logic as indicating that Wang Yangming was much
more ambitious than a mere theoretical philosopher. It suggests to him that Wang did
not seek to present a cold skeleton of abstract principles, but instead (andwhat is in Tu’s
view more important) a living invitation to engage in practical self-improvement. Oth-
ers, however, may not share Tu’s excitement. For, if Tu is right, it would vindicate an
already prevalent, but somewhat disparaging, verdict onWang as a philosopher. Wang
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would be seen as a charismatic teacher, who made suggestive remarks on a range of
topics, but who lacked the discipline to see these remarks through. Wang’s writings
may be inspiring, but that is where their interest ends, for there is simply no worked
out idea behind the showy surface of his alluring style.
Tu does not say explicitly here that those who aim at systematic reconstruction of
Wang’s thought are committed to denying thatWang sawhis practical aims as paramount.
But his remarks strongly suggest that he holds that pursuing systematic reconstruction
is incompatible with recognizing Wang’s own emphasis on the practical development
of his students. Like Gu Dongqiao, Tu seems to think that Wang’s doctrine is either
designed for a practical purpose or focused on a theoretical claim about the nature of
knowledge and action – it cannot be both. But this is precisely the idea that Wang re-
jects in the section of his response to Gu Dongqiao which I quoted at the very start of
the paper as [T1]. Wang tells us that his doctrine of the unity of knowledge and ac-
tion is both a remedy for a disease, and also a description of the natural condition of
knowledge and action. Once we distinguish these aspects of Wang’s thought, we can
see a simple, bold theoretical claim underlying part of Wang’s doctrine. Wang certainly
understood the therapy he administered as his most important philosophical aim. But
he took that therapy to be grounded in his own discoveries in basic science, about the
natural condition of knowledge and action.
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